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Patent Law:
How Big Pharma Delays Generic Entry
Robin Feldman1
The introduction of generic competitors is tough on a brandname drug company, which must face the loss of its monopoly status
and the resulting severe drop in price. The design of the patent
system, however, dictates that a patent holder’s right to exclude
others from the market must end with the expiration of the patent.
Brands and Generics
Today, 88% of all prescriptions in the U.S. are filled using
generic medication. A generic drug normally enters at a 20%
discount from the branded medication, and the price falls quickly
from that point. Eventually, most generics are priced at an 80% to
85% discount from their name-brand equivalents. The FDA estimates
that consumers saved over $217 billion in 2012 alone through the use
of generics, with total savings of $1.68 trillion from 2005 to 2014.
One might call the generic revolution a miracle, but it certainly
did not occur naturally or serendipitously. The underlying
mechanism behind it is particularly complex. Generic drug entry is
covered by the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration
Act, commonly known as the Hatch-Waxman Act. Before the Act,
generic entry into the market was slow. Passed in 1984, HatchWaxman created a pathway to generic entry meant to incentivize the
speedy introduction of generic drugs to market by allowing generic
drug manufacturers to (1) begin the approval process so that they are
ready to launch as soon as the patent expires, and (2) rely on safety
and efficacy testing performed for the branded drug. Hatch-Waxman
also contains incentives to encourage generic companies to challenge
patents that are invalid or should not be applied to a particular drug.

Generic-Delay Tactics

1. Summarized and excerpted from Robin C. Feldman & Evan
Frondorf, Drug Wars: A New Generation of Generic Pharmaceutical Delay,
53 HARV. J. LEGIS. 499 (2016).
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The actual miracle, however, is not the dramatic rise of generics.
Rather, the miracle is that the benefits of Hatch-Waxman have
largely held up despite its complexity and the persistent attempts at
undercutting its aims. Complexity breeds opportunity, and HatchWaxman has created a veritable playground of opportunities that
pharmaceutical companies have used to hold off generic competition.
This is understandable. The temptation to avoid the impact of HatchWaxman can be overpowering when even a few months of additional
monopoly profits can be worth hundreds of millions of dollars or
more. This encourages companies to expend tremendous energy
blocking generic entry by any means possible, with some companies
using ever more clever and complicated strategies. As a result, many
pharmaceutical firms no longer compete solely on the basis of
innovation, but also on their ability to manipulate policy mechanisms
and pathways to extend monopoly and duopoly terms. These
manipulations can be categorized into three “generations” to
illustrate the evolution of generic-delay tactics over time.
In Generation 1.0, delay generally takes the form of “pay-fordelay” settlements, in which a potential generic manufacturer is
simply paid by the brand-name drug maker to refrain from entering
the market until a stipulated date. These settlements were
commonplace for many years, but the Supreme Court’s 2013 ruling
in FTC v. Actavis opened the door to antitrust scrutiny. A recent state
court decision and a large FTC settlement may signal the end of basic
pay-for-delay.
Next has come the rise of a new generation of pay-for-delay
tactics—“Generation 2.0.” Beginning long before Actavis, these
strategies generally involve the transfer of benefits from the branded
firm to a generic manufacturer, but not through a simple cash
settlement. Generation 2.0 agreements include patterns of multiple
side deals, where two companies settle a number of Hatch-Waxman
disputes at once, resulting in a net benefit for the generic firm but
without any large, conspicuous payment. Other instruments include
overvalued agreements in which the generic delays entry but is paid
handsomely to promote, manufacture, or otherwise assist the brandname company with the sale of its drug. Finally, Generation 2.0
includes what are called “boy scout clauses”—agreements to behave
honorably that actually mask anticompetitive collusion. These side
deals are now themselves facing antitrust scrutiny in the courts.
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“Generation 3.0” tactics, so far, have been deployed largely
under the radar. These tactics no longer focus on delay agreements
with generic competitors but rather on using administrative
processes, regulatory schemes with connections to Hatch-Waxman,
and drug modifications to obstruct generics from getting to market.
Many of these strategies have little justification beyond obstruction
of generics, and some recent fact patterns are falling further outside
the boundaries of common sense. These include using so-called
“citizen petitions” to slow down generic entry, refusing to provide
samples that generics need for demonstrating bioequivalence,
refusing to cooperate with generics on safety labels, producthopping, and other blocking tactics. Some of these strategies have
been part of recent schemes to restrict generic substitution while
simultaneously raising prices of the brand-name drug, leading to a
swell of public outrage in fall 2015 and the return of pharmaceuticals
as a key policy topic.
Reform
Shining a spotlight on these problematic behaviors and the
techniques used to mask them leads to ideas for reforming the
generic-entry pathway. These ideas borrow from systems theory—
looking from the perspective of how different systems interact to
create opportunities and incentives to correct suboptimal behaviors.
Moreover, to move the system away from hide-and-seek games,
standards-based legislation and regulation should be adopted. Most
important, to avoid “death by tinkering”—that is, adjusting doctrines
a little here and a little there without comprehensive logic until the
entire area collapses under its own weight—a more comprehensive
overhaul of different intersecting regimes should be pursued. HatchWaxman was indeed a brilliant legislative innovation, heralding
nothing short of a miracle in the reduction of drug costs. Now, it is
time to consider the next generation of the regime so those miracles
are not swept away.

